Employers who learn about a dangerous condition or a defective product and fail to take reasonable steps to fix or warn about it raise sharply practical — and legal — questions. In New York the answers depend on (1) who was injured (an employee or a non-employee), (2) what statutory regimes apply (notably the workers’ compensation statutes and the Labor Law), and (3) what evidence exists showing the employer had actual or constructive notice of the hazard. Below I explain how notice figures into negligence and Labor Law claims in New York, how post-accident conduct (including failure to fix) is treated in evidence, and then walk through a representative case study so you can see those rules in action.

The high-level rule: employees, workers’ compensation, and the “exclusive remedy” doctrine

If the injured person is an employee, New York’s workers’ compensation regime usually provides the exclusive remedy for accidental workplace injuries — meaning an employee who is eligible for workers’ compensation ordinarily cannot sue the employer in tort for ordinary negligence. Courts and practitioners repeatedly emphasize that, in most work-injury situations, the injured employee’s recovery is limited to workers’ compensation benefits.

There is an important exception: a suit against an employer (or a co-employee) is sometimes permitted if the plaintiff can plead and prove an intentional tort (i.e., the employer intentionally caused the harm). New York courts treat intentional-tort claims as outside the workers’-comp exclusivity bar, but the plaintiff bears a heavy burden to show intentional conduct rather than mere negligence or recklessness.

Practical takeaway: if the injured person is a regular employee, ordinary negligence by the employer after a warning will most commonly be remedied through workers’ compensation — not a negligence lawsuit — unless the plaintiff can plausibly allege an intentional wrong.

Where common-law negligence or statutory claims are available: owners, contractors, and non-employees

Even where workers’ compensation blocks a direct negligence suit by an employee against his/her employer, other claims may survive or arise in different fact patterns:

• Non-employees and third parties. Independent contractors, visitors, or other non-employee victims may still sue an employer/owner for negligence in many circumstances.
• Labor Law §200 (the “safe workplace” rule). Section 200 (and corollary common-law negligence claims) can impose liability on property owners, contractors, or agents who created a hazardous condition or who had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous premises condition and failed to remedy it. The courts treat §200 cases in two categories: (a) those involving dangerous premises or conditions (liability if the defendant created the condition or had notice), and (b) those involving the means and methods of work (liability only for parties who exercised control over the work).

Why notice matters under §200: A plaintiff relying on a dangerous-premises theory must show either (i) the defendant created the dangerous condition, or (ii) the defendant had actual notice (knew about the condition) or constructive notice (the condition was so visible and longstanding that the defendant should have discovered it with reasonable diligence) and failed to timely remedy it. That actual/constructive-notice requirement is often the battleground in New York cases.

What counts as notice — actual vs. constructive

• Actual notice is direct knowledge—evidence that the owner/manager was told about the hazard or otherwise saw and knew of it (for example, complaints, written warnings, emails, or testimony that management was informed). Courts cite prior complaints, photographs, and witness testimony as ways to prove actual notice.
• Constructive notice requires that the dangerous condition be “visible and apparent” and exist for a sufficient amount of time that the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered and fixed it. Examples where courts have found triable issues on constructive notice include “old and rusty” permanent fixtures or recurring hazardous conditions that were observable.

Practical takeaway: a contemporaneous warning (an email, safety report, or a supervisor’s verbal notice) can produce actual notice and is often decisive; absent direct evidence, plaintiffs try to show the condition’s visibility and duration to establish constructive notice.

Post-injury failures to act: does ignoring an accident make liability likelier?

Two related questions arise:

(a) Can the plaintiff use the employer’s post-accident failure to remedy as proof the employer was negligent before the accident?

General evidentiary law disfavors proving prior negligence by pointing to remedial measures taken after the accident. Under the federal rule (FRE 407) and New York practice, subsequent remedial measures are generally inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct — the policy is to encourage fixes without fear that those fixes will be used as admissions of prior fault. However, there are important exceptions: such evidence may be admissible for other purposes (ownership/control, feasibility of safeties, or impeachment) if those issues are genuinely in dispute. New York courts follow these same principles and have applied them in workplace and products cases.

(b) But what if the employer didn’t fix the hazard after an earlier warning or after an earlier injury?

A defendant’s failure to take remedial steps after receiving a warning (or after a prior, similar accident) is different from introducing evidence of remedial measures taken after the accident. Evidence that the employer was warned and nevertheless did nothing can be powerful proof of actual notice and of a failure to remedy, and may be admissible as direct proof of the defendant’s state of mind and knowledge. In other words, a prior warning that the defendant ignored is probative of actual notice — and notice is an essential element for many Labor Law §200/common-law claims based on dangerous premises. Courts have repeatedly denied summary judgment when the record contained evidence of prior complaints or other indicia that the defendant had actual or constructive notice.

Practical point: plaintiffs should preserve and highlight evidence of prior warnings, emails, written reports, or complaints. Those items go directly to actual notice — and that is often enough to defeat a defense motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

Evidence strategy and the Rule 407 trap

Because post-accident repairs are often inadmissible to prove negligence, plaintiffs must use the right documentary trail:

• Use pre-accident evidence of notice: complaints, maintenance logs, emails, safety meeting minutes, prior incident reports, photographs, and testimony showing the condition existed long enough to be discovered. Those items are admissible and often dispositive on notice.
• If a defendant argues feasibility or control is not at issue, plaintiffs can sometimes admit evidence of repairs to show feasibility — but to do that the plaintiff must establish that feasibility or control is actually contested and thus “at issue” in the case. Courts scrutinize such attempts.

Case study — Houston v. McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc., 124 A.D.3d 1210 (4th Dep’t 2015)

Facts (short version): The estate of a sanitation-worker decedent sued various parties after a fatal garbage truck accident. Among other claims, the plaintiff alleged negligence based on insufficient inspection and failure to warn of a dangerous condition associated with the truck and the leasing arrangements. One defendant (H Leasing) owned and leased the truck to the employer.

Key legal issues: Was H Leasing liable in negligence for failing to inspect and warn of a dangerous condition? Did the record raise a triable issue as to H Leasing’s knowledge (actual or constructive notice) or control?

Court’s outcome and reasoning: The Appellate Division found that, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the submissions raised a triable issue of fact whether H Leasing could be liable in negligence for failure to inspect and warn — i.e., there was enough evidence to suggest the lessor either knew about the condition or failed to exercise reasonable inspection/supervision. The court declined to resolve those notice/control questions as a matter of law on a pretrial motion.

Why this case matters for the warning/no-action scenario: Houston illustrates (1) that ownership/lessor relationships can carry duties to inspect/warn, and (2) that evidence suggesting prior knowledge or inadequate inspection will often create triable issues for a jury. When a plaintiff can show an owner/lessor had a realistic opportunity to know of and remedy a hazard — or had been warned — courts will often refuse to dismiss negligence claims at the summary judgment stage.

(For another ladder-related example where a party’s loaned equipment and its condition were pivotal, see Navarro v. City of New York and other ladder-fall decisions; courts treat visible, longstanding dangerous conditions and prior complaints as central to notice determinations.) (

Putting it together — practical implications for plaintiffs, employers, and counsel

For injured persons or plaintiffs’ lawyers:

• If you’re an employee, expect to start with a workers’ compensation claim; identify whether any intentional-tort facts exist that might take the case outside the exclusivity rule.
• Preserve any pre-accident evidence of warning or complaints (emails, maintenance tickets, safety reports, eyewitness testimony) — those items go to actual notice and are admissible.
• Use prior incidents or recurring conditions to argue constructive notice (visible, apparent, and longstanding).

For employers and risk managers:

• A written, documented response to warnings matters. Taking and documenting remedial steps promptly reduces exposure — and the documentation of fixes taken before an accident can often be helpful and is, in many contexts, admissible for issues like feasibility or control. But beware that evidence of repairs after an accident may be excluded from proof of prior negligence under Rule 407 unless an exception applies.
• Treat warnings seriously: a contemporaneous record that you investigated and corrected a hazard curtails an injured party’s ability to argue you had actual notice and did nothing.

For defense counsel:

• Attack the causal chain: show the plaintiff’s own conduct caused the injury, or show lack of control/authority to remedy the condition (especially in §200 “means and methods” cases). If the hazard was not visible or longstanding, argue constructive notice is absent. Courts routinely grant summary judgment when defendants establish they lacked actual or constructive notice.

Employers and property owners in New York have a clear legal and moral duty to maintain safe working environments. When they receive warnings about dangerous conditions or defective products and fail to act, that inaction can form the foundation of liability — particularly where evidence shows they had actual or constructive notice of the danger. Under Labor Law §200 and common-law negligence principles, notice is often the key element distinguishing unavoidable accidents from preventable negligence.

For employees, New York’s workers’ compensation law typically limits recovery to statutory benefits, unless the employer’s conduct rises to the level of an intentional act. However, for non-employees, contractors, and others injured by unsafe conditions, evidence of prior complaints or ignored warnings can be decisive in establishing liability.

Even after an injury occurs, employers must act swiftly to correct hazards; continued inaction can expose them to future claims and strengthen the argument that they failed to meet their duty of care. In short, notice creates responsibility — and in New York, ignoring it can transform an avoidable hazard into a costly legal liability.

John Caravella Esq., is a construction attorney and formerly practicing project architect at The Law Office of John Caravella, P.C., representing architects, engineers, contractors, subcontractors, and owners in all phases of contract preparation, litigation, and arbitration across New York and Florida. He also serves as an arbitrator to the American Arbitration Association Construction Industry Panel. Mr. Caravella can be reached by email: John@LIConstructionLaw.com or (631) 608-1346.

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Resources

• Overview of exclusive remedy doctrine and suing employers in New York. (The Orlow Firm)
• Labor Law §200: scope, notice, and control issues — practice notes and Appellate Division discussion. (New York Courts)
• Constructive vs. actual notice (practice comments and recent applications). (CaseMine)
• Evidence: Rule 407 / subsequent remedial measures — federal rule and New York court guidance on admissibility and exceptions. (Legal Information Institute)
• Case study — Houston v. McNeilus Truck & Mfg., 124 A.D.3d 1210 (4th Dep’t 2015) (triable issue on failure to inspect/warn). (Justia Law)